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Abstract 
 
 This paper analyzes the concept of “transformation” that many allege has occurred recently 
in a wide variety of national industrial relations systems.  After a summary of the debate, with 
particular reference to the contentious case of Germany, we attempt to develop a definition of 
industrial relations system transformation on the basis of biological analogies and, in particular, 
the “punctuated equilibrium” theory.  We examine the cases of the United States, Sweden, South 
Africa, and New Zealand, and conclude that the application of the biological frameworks raises a 
set of fundamental questions that must be addressed in order for the debate over the existence of 
industrial relations transformation to move forward.  
 
 
 
 
 Christopher L. Erickson and Sarosh Kuruvilla 
 
 
 
 May 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The authors are associate professor in the Human Resources and Organizational Behavior 
area of the UCLA Anderson Graduate School of Management and associate professor in the 
Collective Bargaining, Labor Law, and Labor History department and International and 
Comparative Industrial Relations department of the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at 
Cornell University, respectively.  We thank Torben Andersen, Jack Fiorito, Stephen Frenkel, 
Connie J.G. Gersick, Miriam Golden, Sanford Jacoby, Harry Katz, Michael Piore, Anil Verma, 
Michael Wallerstein, and Niels Westergaard-Nielsen for their comments on earlier drafts of this 
paper, as well as seminar participants at the Fourth Bargaining Group conference, Aarhus School 
of Business, Michigan State University, Seoul National University, Cornell, and UCLA.  Partial 
funding was provided by a research grant from the UCLA Academic Senate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 1.  Introduction 
In recent years, a debate has opened regarding  “transformations” of industrial relations 
systems in a variety of countries. On the one hand, there is a  growing body of research that argues 
for the existence of such widespread transformations. What is remarkable is that these  alleged 
transformations have occurred during the last two decades all over the world. For example, several 
authors have argued that there have been fundamental changes in industrial relations in various 
OECD countries (Locke, Kochan, and Piore (1995); Katz (1993), Swenson(1989); Kochan, Katz, 
and McKersie (1986);  Streeck(1988); Frenkel (1988); Bray and Hayworth(1993); Armingeon 
(1994)).  Some authors have also noted transformations in developing nations in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America (Kuruvilla (1996), Webster(1997), Cook (1996)), and as well there is a body of 
research that examines transformations in industrial relations in the former  Soviet block (Jurgens, 
Klinzig, and Turner(1993), Jones (1995)).  
Despite this body of research arguing for widespread transformation, there is also 
disagreement  about whether transformation is in fact occurring.  For example, in studies of 
several of the same advanced European countries examined by Katz, Crouch(1993) and 
Hyman(1994) argued that there has been essentially no transformation in industrial relations in 
these countries.  And, Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (1997) analyzed data on industrial relations 
in 8 Northern and Central European countries over the period 1950-90, concluding that there has 
not been a widespread transformation over the last two decades.  Finally, Dunlop(1993) 
categorically rejects the arguments regarding recent industrial relations transformation in the 
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United States and, by extension, in many other countries where transformations have been 
claimed. 
Thus, there appears to be substantial disagreement about the extent of recent 
transformation of industrial relations systems around the world.   The debate raises several basic 
questions about the developments in the various national industrial relations systems.  Are the 
changes in industrial relations seen in the 1980s and 1990s really fundamental (do they constitute 
transformation)?  And, more generally, how might we distinguish “transformation” from “non-
fundamental change,” and are there different types of industrial relations system 
“transformations”?   
Before this debate can be resolved and these questions adequately addressed, however, it is 
necessary to consider whether the various authors are addressing the same concept; is there even a 
common definition of “transformation?”  Our answer to this question, based on our reading of the 
literature, is an unqualified “NO!”  We also find that, absent a common definition and agreement 
on what constitutes transformation, different authors have used widely different types of evidence 
to support their transformation theses.  
Our purposes in this paper are fourfold.  First, we summarize the existing definitions of 
and arguments regarding recent industrial relations transformation.  Second, we briefly analyze the 
manner in which several of these definitions have been applied to a particularly contentious and 
well-documented country case:  Germany; the analysis of this case helps to sharpen our 
understanding of the disagreement.  Next, we provide an argument of our own for the meaning of 
the distinctions between “transformation” and “non-fundamental change” and between 
“incremental” and “discontinuous” transformations, based on analogies from evolutionary biology 
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and especially the “punctuated equilibrium” theory of social change. We end by discussing the 
questions for future research raised by the application of these analogies and by briefly applying 
the analogies to industrial relations change in several countries, with a particular emphasis on the 
developments in industrial relations in the twentieth century in the United States.   
 
2.  Definitions of Industrial Relations “Transformation” 
An examination of the literature on the recent development of industrial relations systems 
indicates a lack of consensus on what constitutes “transformation,” or fundamental change.  The 
influential book The Transformation of American Industrial Relations (Kochan, Katz and 
McKersie(1986)) has formed the basis for much of the debate, if not a common structure or 
definition for understanding the concept.  Kochan, Katz, and McKersie considered the level where 
bargaining takes place and who makes the key strategic decisions, and argued that decentralization 
in bargaining,  management’s increased autonomy, and the switch to a bundle of workplace 
practices that included teams, contingent pay, employee participation, training, and employment 
security amounted to a transformation in the United States.   
In another examination of recent industrial relations change, a cross-national analysis of 
studies of collective bargaining, Katz(1993) found that a common feature of industrial relations 
change in Sweden, Australia, the former West Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States was significant employer-initiated decentralization of bargaining.   Locke, Kochan, 
and Piore (1995) emphasized four common factors in the transformations of the United States, 
United Kingdom, Australia, Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Japan, and Canada: 
an enterprise focus (as the locus of human resources and industrial relations decision making and 
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strategy), increased flexibility (in how work is organized and labor is deployed), the growing 
importance of skill development, and union membership declines. Armingeon (1994) emphasized 
changes in industrial relations legislation in order to claim that there has been transformation in 21 
European countries.  Kuruvilla (1996) focused on overall national industrial relations and human 
resource management policies in selected Asian countries, and suggested that a change in national 
IR/HR policy goals of stability to that of workplace flexibility is evidence that some Asian 
systems are transforming.  
On the anti-transformation side,  Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (1997) examined 
quantifiable indicators of union strength and bargaining decentralization over the past 40 years: 
union density and coverage rates, union concentration and monopoly, the statutory authority 
exercised by both central union and central employer organizations, and the centralization of wage 
bargaining.1   On the basis of their analysis of these indicators, they concluded that industrial 
relations and collective bargaining have remained essentially stable in most of the 8 Northern and 
Central European countries in their sample, and that only Sweden shows evidence of a substantial 
recent decentralization of collective bargaining.  
Crouch(1993) considered the stability of formal institutional mechanisms, such as laws 
regarding co-determination, in concluding that we have not seen major change in most European 
industrial relations systems since the era of state formation, when the basic and stable “social 
bargain” was negotiated in each of these countries.  He argued that national industrial relations 
systems in Europe have been essentially stable over the twentieth century, that situations of 
 
1 In a related study, Golden and Wallerstein (1996) examined these indicators as well as the extent of autonomy of 
shopfloor union organizations, the extent of confederal control of wage bargaining, and the extent to which national 
industrial unions control  wage setting in 16 OECD countries over the same period, reaching substantially similar 
conclusions. 
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change in style and structure (due to imitation) are rare, and that differences in industrial relations 
systems, particularly the presence or absence of neocorporatist industrial relations structures, are 
stable and “reflect deeper historical differences in the occupancy of political space” (pp. 349-50).2 
 Hyman(1994) analyzed the dimensions of change in management initiative, decline of 
unionism, deregulation of labor markets, and decline of national systems in the twelve EC and 
seven EFTA countries (as of the time of his writing).  On this basis he largely rejected the 
hypotheses of recent transformation and convergence toward a new post-Fordist model. 
Dunlop(1993) argued in regard to the debate over the transformation of the United States 
industrial relations system that “Most of the developments of the 1980s in my view represented 
adaptations to the changing demographic, market, technological, and political environment, and to 
the relations among the actors, inducing changes in the contours of the system and some rules; but 
they did not fundamentally transform the United States industrial relations system” (p. 21).  He 
suggests that  a true transformation requires a radical change in the external constraints 
influencing the system, as has been occurring in the political/economic system of the former 
Soviet Union. He also argues that “The Transformation of American Industrial Relations cannot 
be a general theory of industrial relations … for it is not directly applicable to other countries that 
are advanced or are developing in the third world” (p. 20), apparently due to his perception of the 
institutional specificity of Kochan, Katz and McKersie’s argument. 
Others have examined industrial relations outcomes such as wage dispersion and wage 
 
2 Nevertheless, Crouch does give some credence to arguments that neo-corporatist institutions, fundamentally 
dependent on political and (usually) national structures, are being eroded (or at least being made redundant) by the 
growing autonomy of the company in industrial relations, that “while neo-corporatism may have been useful for the 
macro-level stabilization crises of the 1970s, it is less equipped for the detailed, company-by-company restructuring 
characteristic of the contemporary economy” (p. 343).  He also concludes that “Any new lease of life for neo-
corporatist institutions will depend on either the construction of more broadly-based labor coalitions, or on the 
 
 
 
 
 
7
                                                                                                                                                                                         
“drift” in particular.  While this approach holds the promise of providing meaningful tests of the 
hypotheses regarding recent decentralization of responsibility, decision-making, and industrial 
relations policy-making, these studies have found mixed evidence of increased variation in 
industrial relations outcomes in various countries (e.g. the volume by Freeman and Katz(1995)). 
Clearly, then, the authors in this debate examine different aspects of the hypothesized 
industrial relations “transformation.”  Some examine formal institutional structure such as 
legislation or union density and coverage, while others examine informal or process-oriented 
indicators such as the extent of employer versus union initiative in bringing about change or the 
level of the industrial relations system which constitutes the “locus” of decision making and 
strategy.  Still others examine quantifiable outcomes of the industrial relations process, such as 
wage dispersion.  Some focus on wage setting, while others examine a broader range of aspects of 
the employment relationship.  Given these differences, summarized in Table 1, it should hardly be 
surprising that the various authors can reach such different conclusions. 
 
---  INSERT  TABLE  1  ABOUT  HERE  --- 
 
The differences in definition and approach taken  by the various authors thus clouds the 
basic underlying issue: is there a fundamental change (or “transformation”) in structure and 
practice taking place in industrial relations systems world-wide?  This debate raises the question 
of whether “decentralization” amounts to “transformation.”  And, if it does, can it be meaningfully 
quantified?  And, if it can, why do Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (1997) in particular fail to find 
 
initiative in securing the stability of an organized economy moving to the employers.  The latter must imply a shift 
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“hard” evidence of significant decentralization in many countries where others have drawn the 
opposite conclusion based on more qualitative evidence?  Alternatively, should “transformation” 
be defined in terms of legislation, formal institutional mechanisms, government economic 
strategies, or some combination thereof?  Or, should it be defined not in terms of industrial 
relations system structure and process, but rather in terms of system outcomes such as the 
diffusion of innovative workplace and compensation practices or wage drift and dispersion?  This 
lack of clarity and agreement on fundamentals is apparent in the differing analyses of a widely-
studied country case: Germany; we turn next to a brief summary of the arguments regarding 
transformation (or lack thereof) of the German industrial relations system in order to examine the 
debate in more concrete terms. 
 
3.  An Illustrative Country Case:  Germany 
The arguments for the existence of a transformation of the German industrial relations 
system generally boil down to the proposition that the locus of collective bargaining and worker 
influence more generally have significantly decentralized from the industry or regional levels to 
the establishment or enterprise level, that the enhanced role of the works councils in local 
bargaining amounts to a significant enough shift in the process and outcomes of negotiations to 
constitute a “transformation.”3  This view is perhaps most explicitly stated by Streeck (1988):  
 
 While central features of the West German system of collective bargaining have 
remained in place - in particular, the practice of interconnected industry-wide 
agreements and the ‘strike monopoly’ of industrial unions, making for relatively low 
wage drift and low wage differentials between firms, industries, and regions - there 
 
in the balance of systems towards the level of the company” (p. 350). 
3 Note that the existing literature mostly abstracts from the issues raised by the unification of the former East 
Germany with the FRG, which occurred after the alleged transformation had begun. 
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have also been significant changes.  However, since these changes have proceeded 
gradually and along the lines of evolutionary tendencies that have been present for at 
least two decades, they are not always obvious.  Nevertheless, in effect they add up 
to a cumulative transformation of the system, in the course of which the centre of 
gravity of collective bargaining is shifted from the industrial to the establishment and 
enterprise level, where workers are not represented directly by trade unions but by 
elected works councils.  (pp. 22-23).4
 
 
Similarly, Katz (1993), in his review of work on decentralization of bargaining in several 
countries, concluded that  
 In Germany … a number of analysts have observed a significant shift toward 
decentralization in the importance and amount of negotiations that occur inside the 
works councils at the plant level … The productivity coalitions being negotiated at 
the plant and workshop level typically involve changes in work organization and 
team work … Although the formal structure of collective bargaining has not 
changed, a more decentralized bargaining structure has resulted from changes in the 
sectoral collective bargaining agreements. (p. 8).  
 
 However, Crouch (1993) and Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (1997) reach very different 
conclusions.  Crouch concluded that an enduring social contract has led to “organized industrial 
politics” in Germany over the past 100 years; he places Germany firmly in the class of 
“facilitating” corporatist systems, and argues for inherent stability, even across the pre- and post-
war periods, but certainly during recent decades. 
 Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange argue for stability of the German system on the basis of 
their quantitative measures of the structures of collective bargaining (particularly wage setting) 
 
4 The same basic argument has been advanced by Koch (1995): “Works councils are a central feature of the German 
industrial relations system.  As German unification has progressed their role has become increasingly central to the 
collective bargaining process… Evidence suggests that the transformation process in Germany has allowed works 
councils to evolve into flexible and responsive institutions”  (abstract).   
      Baethge and Wolf (1995) argue that “During the 1980s a gradual transition took place as the bargaining process 
shifted from the industry to the firm level … Increasingly works councils, rather than the unions, are assuming the 
primary role in interest representation …” (p. 231).  “Just because the formal structures of the German model have 
not yet collapsed, we should not obscure the important changes that have taken place in recent years.  These social 
developments raise questions about the assumptions of how the society ought to function …” (p. 250). 
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and the industrial relations system.  Briefly, they found that union density and coverage, 
interconfederal union concentration, formal statutory authority of national metalworking 
workers’ and employers’ associations (the DGB and BDA), and confederal and government 
involvement in private-sector wage bargaining  have been basically stable.  In a related study, 
Golden and Wallerstein (1996), on the key question of “autonomy of the shopfloor,” examined 
the dimensions of “(1) whether shopfloor representatives are required to be union members; (2) 
whether shopfloor representatives can be dismissed or replaced by higher levels of union 
organizations; (3) whether shopfloor representatives have to negotiate enterprise or plant level 
agreements and (4) whether shopfloor representatives have their own strike funds or 
automatically are entitled to them in the event of industrial conflicts” (p. 56).  On this basis, they 
also argue for a lack of significant change in German shopfloor industrial relations. 
 Finally, in a study of the outcomes of the wage negotiations process, Abraham and 
Houseman (1995) studied overall earnings inequality and earnings differentials across skill, 
education, and age groups over the 1970s and 1980s in the former West Germany.   Contrary to 
prior studies based on less comprehensive data sets (e.g. Davis (1992)), they found no evidence 
of growing earnings inequality or widening earnings differentials along these dimensions, 
suggesting a lack of decentralization in outcomes. 
 In this case, the contrast between the conclusions of those who analyze formal institutional 
structures as compared to those who analyze informal process is particularly stark.  Works 
councils have no more formal authority than previously, and on this basis (as well as on the basis 
of other quantifiable indicators of structure), Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange conclude that the 
German system has not transformed.  On the other hand, on the basis of less quantifiable 
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indicators, others conclude that there has been a substantial shift in the “center of gravity” of 
collective bargaining , as evidenced in the new substance of the sectoral agreements, particularly 
as regards productivity coalitions and the allocation of working time.5  In a certain sense, the 
debate seems to be between the question of what works councils CAN do (which hasn’t changed 
much) as against what they in fact are doing (which seems to have changed a great deal).  An 
important question, then, is to what extent do significant changes in workplace practice and the 
locus of emphasis of strategy and competitiveness amount to a transformation of an industrial 
relations system?  Should such changes, if truly amounting to a transformation, show up in 
quantifiable outcomes?  And, which outcomes and with how much of a time lag?  Most basically, 
how can we measure the “significance” of a decentralization of the substance of bargaining and 
interest representation?6
 
4.  The Distinctions between (1) “Non-Fundamental Change” and “Transformation” 
and (2) “Incremental” and “Discontinuous” Transformation : Some Theoretical 
Structure based on Evolutionary Biology. 
Given the intense debate, and the confusion caused by definitional differences, we attempt 
to bring some clarity to the issue by distinguishing between “non-fundamental change” and 
“transformation” and between “incremental” and “discontinuous” transformations.  In order  to 
provide a framework for understanding these distinctions, we utilize the evolutionary biology 
versus punctuated equilibrium debate (Darwin (1859), Gould (1991))  in the natural sciences as a 
 
5 Turner (1992) provides a comprehensive analysis of the new roles of the works councils. 
6 Note that recent events suggest that the decentralization and emphasis on flexibility may now start showing up in 
wage outcomes:  on June 4, 1997, the chemical workers’ unions agreed to a contract allowing companies to 
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metaphor, postulating that each model has some relevance for different types of social system 
change. In other words, as we will discuss below, we do not view evolution and punctuated 
equilibrium as either/or descriptors of any and all industrial relations system change (although 
some may choose to make such an argument), but rather as two imperfect metaphors for different 
types of change in industrial relations systems.  
This framework essentially allows us to describe the process of change in a given 
industrial relations system and to evaluate the extent of “transformation,” and its application could 
potentially help researchers to identify the critical differences across nations that make systems 
adaptive or nonadaptive.  One advantage of using this framework is that it is largely “culture free,” 
i.e. not clouded by vagaries of national culture, an essential requirement for cross national 
explanation. Again, we will attempt to sharpen the distinction between transformation and non-
fundamental change and to describe two types of transformation through the use of the biological 
analogies; we first focus on clarifying the concept of evolutionary change or adaptation.  
An important characteristic of the concept of evolution is Darwin’s principle of functional 
change in structural continuity. The problem this principle attempts to address is this.  We can 
understand how fully developed structures work, such as the various parts of the German 
industrial relations and economic systems.  Yet, how do we understand how these complex 
systems evolved slowly to their current state?  An analogy in natural history, described in 
Gould(1991), is that we know what a wing is. Yet, birds did not always have wings. The problem 
then is how can natural selection explain the incipient stages of structures that can only be used in 
more elaborate form? In other words, birds can fly with wings, but no bird can fly with 2% of a 
 
negotiate wage reductions (in exchange for no-layoff guarantees) with local unions, and to negotiate local 
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wing. The wing is a structure that can only be used in its most elaborated form (100% of the wing, 
but not in any lesser form).  The principle of functional change in structural continuity simply 
states that it is possible for gradual conversion to occur from one function to another.  This idea of 
functional shift has been used to explain why birds have wings, though birds descended from 
reptiles, who now don’t have wings. The hypothesis is that wings originally performed the 
function of thermoregulation, since they were analogous to reptilian scales.  
In industrial relations terms, the implication is that a fundamental change of function in 
any one institution can still be an evolutionary (or incremental) and not  a revolutionary (or 
discontinuous) change.  For example, the  National Wages Council in Singapore was designed to 
keep wage increases uniform throughout the economy, and competitive with regard to other Asian 
nations, at a time when Singapore’s economic development strategy was based on export oriented 
industrialization based on low labor costs (Kuruvilla (1996)). Today, however, the National 
Wages Council emphasizes the need for non-uniform wage increases, and its once powerful 
presence in the economy has faded somewhat with the increasing decentralization and variance in 
pay across the private sector. The NWC thus is performing a very different function compared to 
what it was designed to do, and its relative decline in recent years has been suggested to be a 
fundamental change.  But, using the functional change in structural continuity metaphor, this 
could well be indicative of another evolutionary step in Singapore’s industrial relations system, 
i.e. it is consistent with an evolutionary point of view, suggesting adaptability. 
A second implication of natural selection is that there is a significant effect of contingency 
and incumbency in evolution; i.e., Gould (1991) calls a historical event contingent when it occurs 
 
exemptions from industry-wide work rules (New York Times, 6/5/97). 
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as a result of a long string of unpredictable consequences rather than as a necessary outcome of 
natural laws. Such contingent events depend crucially on choices made in the distant past. Minor 
changes made early in the game can nudge a process onto a new pathway.   Small and unimportant 
changes, unrelated to the working integrity of a complex creature or organization, may often lead 
a system into a new direction.  Such a consequence, if viewed from the perspective of the current 
outcome, may seem fundamentally different compared to the old system, yet it would not, in 
evolutionary theory terms, be classified as revolutionary or discontinuous given its historical links 
to small decisions in the past.  For example it can be argued that the efforts of Singapore and 
Malaysia to introduce “house” unions were small changes, but that has resulted in fundamentally 
altering labor-management relations in those countries over time. Similarly, in the Philippines, the 
Aquino government’s encouragement of voluntary arbitration and joint labor management 
councils, which constituted small changes in Philippine industrial relations policy at the time,  
have arguably led to debates calling for a fundamental redesigning of the entire Philippine 
industrial relations system (Kuruvilla (1996)).    
These considerations suggest that gradual or “evolutionary” change can result in major 
changes in structures, such as institutions, with the passage of time and the development of 
practice.7  They also suggest that the extent and nature of system “transformation” cannot be 
evaluated by considering the changes in particular institutions (such as bargaining structure) in 
isolation, or without consideration of the process driving these changes.  Thus, the analogy with 
 
7 At first glance, we might easily conclude that the existence of human agency seriously limits the applicability of 
these biological analogies.  After all, a lizard certainly does not consciously attempt to become a bird.  How about 
entire social systems, such as an industrial relations system, though?  Even if a single “actor” or “group of actors” 
attempts to transform a complex social system, is there any reason to expect that the intended consequences will 
result?  The particular difficulties involved in designing structures and policies so as to achieve intended results, as 
well as the compromise nature of much of (democratic) policymaking and just the extreme complexity of most 
 
 
 
 
 
15
evolutionary biology may help to provide researchers with a framework that allows nuanced 
judgments as to whether a change is transformatory , and if so whether it is smoothly evolutionary 
or discontinuous.  We next attempt to develop these ideas further by appealing to another 
biological analogy. 
 An alternative biological theory to continuously smooth evolution is punctuated 
equilibrium theory, used primarily in natural history (Elderedge and Gould 1972), but also used in 
a variety of  different contexts, such as in the study of the history of science (Kuhn 1962), 
industrial  transformation (Abernathy and Utterback 1982), organizations  (Miller  and Friesan 
1984), group development (Gersick 1988), adult  development (Levinson 1978), and technology 
(Piore and Sabel 1984).  It has also been applied in studies of aspects of industrial relations change 
in earlier historical periods, as in Collier and Collier’s (1991) analysis of Latin American state 
strategies of dealing with the labor movement, and Gordon, Edwards, and Reich’s (1982) analysis 
of the transformations of labor over the history of the United States.  Our  application of the 
framework to the question of recent industrial relations system change, we argue,  provides a basis 
for an understanding of industrial relations system transformation in a variety of national contexts 
where gradual adaptation of existing structures does not occur.   This analogy helps us to clarify 
the definition of  “discontinuous” industrial relations transformation, and the definitional 
arguments regarding punctuated equilibria also provide a framework for evaluating the general 
concept of transformation, whether incremental or discontinuous.  
The basic notion behind applying the "punctuated equilibrium"  theory to social 
development is that a social system - such as an industrial relations system - undergoes periods of 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
social systems suggests to us that these biological analogies might have more applicability at the level of social 
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apparent stability with only gradual and non-fundamental change punctuated by periods of rapid 
change when the basic assumptions and principles underlying that system come under  question.  
In their seminal work on organizational ecology, Hannan and  Freeman(1989) describe the generic 
form of the "punctuated equilibrium"  view of change as follows: "most of evolutionary history 
shows little change except for brief periods or punctuations in which  there is rapid speciation and 
great increases in diversity.... the punctuations are due to combinations of environmental 
circumstances that  open new niches into which new forms ... can radiate"(p. 38). 
Gersick(1991), who describes the generic form of the theory as "an alternation between 
long periods when stable infrastructures permit  only incremental adaptations, and brief periods of 
revolutionary upheaval" (p. 10), argues that the three main components of the punctuated 
equilibrium paradigm are deep structure, equilibrium periods, and revolutionary periods. She 
further posits that "the first of these,  deep structure, is the most critical for understanding the 
models, and it is the hardest concept to define and communicate" (p. 13); she  defines it as "a 
network of fundamental, interdependent 'choices,' of the basic configuration into which a system's 
units are organized, and  the activities that maintain both this configuration and the system's 
resource exchange with the environment.  Deep structure in human systems  is largely implicit" (p. 
15).  Using Gersick's terminology, then,  a central question regarding whether an industrial 
relations system change is “transformatory” is the extent to which change in “deep structure” 
comes under serious consideration. 
In the realm of social system change, we also posit that the  "punctuated equilibrium" 
theory bears a close relationship to the French  "regulation" framework (Boyer(1990)), postulating 
 
system change than in other, more micro realms of intentional human activity.  
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in its essence that  once regulatory mechanisms consistent with a given environment appear  and 
develop, they both stabilize and thrive on the stability of that  environment, until the regulatory 
system loses its viability and massive  experimentation eventually leads to the development of a 
new system both internally consistent and viable in the new environment. In this realm  of macro 
social system change, the theory also has clear antecedents  within Marxian dialectical 
materialism: the idea of a system intensifying its  contradictions and following its own inherent 
logic until the system  collapses under the weight of that logic (Hofstader (1945)).  As, for 
example, in Piore and Sabel's (1984) analysis of technological choice in  economic systems, in the 
more general version of the theory periods of  revolutionary change are brought about by a 
complex interplay of factors  internal to the system in conjunction with external influences. 
Clearly, a basic question involves the extent to which factors internal to a given system (such as 
demographics), factors external to a given system (such as the alleged recent “globalization” of 
the world economy), or a complex interplay of the two tend to drive system change.  
In addition, some variants of the theory imply that during periods of crisis, the basic 
parameters of the system are "up for grabs," or  particularly contingent and unpredictable (Piore 
and Sabel(1984)). The system could emerge from its period of revolutionary change to go in many 
possible and radically different directions, depending on such things as history, politics, natural 
endowments, and the force of certain personalities.  David(1985) refers to this phenomenon as 
“path dependence.”   However, regardless of how contingent or determined the changes are, once 
the new "deep structure" underlying the emergent  system has been established, it forms the basis 
for a period of stability.  
As Hannan and Freeman and Gersick suggest, periods of revolutionary change are 
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characterized by the following : 
a)   During such periods the fundamental assumptions and principles underlying the system come 
under question. In other words, there is a re-consideration of what Gersick calls the “deep 
structure.” 
b)   The change is rapid, and between periods of rapid change, there are longer periods of stability. 
c)    These are periods during which there is great experimentation and increases in speciation and 
diversity, as various new forms are experimented with before one dominant form takes root. 
We posit that those general questions are the appropriate place to start when considering 
the extent to which a “transformation” has occurred in a given industrial relations system.   Is 
there a serious re-consideration of the “deep structure” of the basic principles of the industrial 
relations system?  Is change in structure and practice occurring rapidly relative to the past?  Is 
there widespread experimentation and “speciation” occurring in such realms as workplace 
practices?  In our view, the first question regarding reconsideration of deep structure is the 
common element determining transformation (as opposed to “non-fundamental change”) in 
general, while the second and third questions are relevant to the distinction between the two types 
of transformation, discontinuous and incremental.  We will return to these distinctions below. 
 
5.  Broad Implications for Future Research into Industrial Relations System Change 
There are several important implications for future research into industrial relations system 
change that can be drawn from the biological analogies presented above.  The analogies suggest 
that the essence of “transformation” of a system is the extent to which “deep structure,” or the 
network of fundamental, interdependent choices that determine the basic configuration into which 
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an industrial relations system’s units are organized, has been reconsidered. While much of the 
previous literature has examined a variety of outcomes8 without a clear focus on the changes in 
underlying structures that truly distinguish transformation from non-transformative change, these 
analogies suggest that it would be most fruitful to focus on those underlying structures.  The first, 
and perhaps most difficult task is to identify the key components of the “deep structure” of a given 
social system, and whether reconsideration of deep structure has occurred; if so, the biological 
analogies would suggest that the change be labeled as a “transformation.”    In other words, a key 
task for future research is to understand what is the composition of key underlying structures, as 
well as the dynamics of these structures that make some changes transformative in nature, whether 
the change is incremental or discontinuous  
Second, researchers should attempt to distinguish between “incremental” (or adaptive) and 
“discontinuous” (or punctuated equilibrium) transformations and be clear as to which type of 
transformation is occurring in each particular case.  Previous research has mostly neglected this 
distinction.  Because both types of transformations involve reconsideration of “deep structure,” or 
basic underlying assumptions, the two types of “transformation” do not necessarily differ in 
outcomes per se, but rather in the process of change.  We have argued here that the two factors 
suggesting discontinuity, or a punctuation, are the speed of change relative to the past history of a 
given system, and the occurrence of marked increases of speciation and diversity, or 
experimentation with new forms.  
A related question for future research is whether one type of transformation is more 
common than the other.  Can the various national industrial relations systems be categorized in 
 
8 As noted above in the review of studies on Germany, the outcomes examined include such things as bargaining 
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terms of the type of recent change, incremental or discontinuous?  And, do industrial relations 
systems generally tend to undergo significant change in brief punctuations, or do they tend to be 
more adaptive?  An extreme hypothesis to investigate here would be whether industrial relations 
change (and perhaps social system change more generally) is necessarily discontinuous; i.e. 
whether “punctuated equilibrium” is in fact synonymous with “transformation” in this context.  
Can a complex social system in fact gradually evolve into something very different, in the process 
calling into question and perhaps changing underlying basic assumptions?  As we will discuss 
below, in our view, the diversity in experience of national industrial relations systems clearly 
suggests the possibility that some industrial relations systems are more adaptive than others, and 
that fundamental transformation of deep structure does not generically require punctuated change, 
but we recognize that this is a controversial and unresolved question. 
 
6.  Examples of Industrial Relations Transformations in Terms of the Biological 
Analogies 
As noted above, the biological analogies suggest two types of “transformations”: 
incremental or adaptive, and discontinuous or punctuated, with both involving reconsideration of 
deep structure.   We will mainly provide recent examples of punctuated equilibria in industrial 
relations systems in this section in order to illustrate and emphasize the most radical and 
controversial of the biological analogies, but we want to emphasize that, in our view,  
“incremental” or “adaptive” transformations are also possible; we will return to this point at the 
end of this section, when we briefly re-consider the German case. 
 
structures, workplace practices, and earnings outcomes. 
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In the realm of industrial relations, the punctuated equilibrium argument is, briefly, as 
follows.  Industrial  relations systems get set at certain historical moments and  remain so without 
major modification for extended periods of time (e.g. Katz, Kuruvilla, and Turner (1994)). Thus, 
although industrial relations systems are dynamic, and continuously evolve and change, there are 
key historical junctures or moments of transition when the systems undergo rapid change, “deep 
structure” (such as the basic assumptions regarding the nature of the employment relationship) 
comes under serious consideration, and there is a great deal of experimentation in industrial 
relations policy and practice. Between  such critical junctures, the systems typically undergo 
relatively minor modifications (or, in other terms, they evolve).  The key historical junctures 
represent punctuations or “discontinuous transformations.” 
Relatively uncontroversial examples of a punctuations in industrial relations systems do 
exist.  For example, it is widely accepted that the Swedish system, which  evidenced a steady 
evolution into the famous Swedish model since 1938,  underwent a fundamental transformation in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Swedish collective bargaining model was based on the need 
for a delicate balance between representation and incomes policy mediation (Ryner (1994)).  The 
centralized wage bargaining system resulted in moderate wage increases and relatively low strike 
rates, the government complemented the centralized bargaining system by following an 
expansionary fiscal policy and an active labor market policy, and trade unions used the system to 
implement their solidaristic wage policies that were focused on reducing inequality among the 
labor force (Swenson (1989)).  
In the middle of the 1980s, this centralized bargaining system began to be questioned by 
many employers, given differences in the economic environments facing different industries. They 
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pushed unsuccessfully for more decentralization, and by the latter half of the 1980s, the tensions 
between the LO and the SAF and within the different industrial unions and employers in these 
federations could not be contained any longer. Thus the bargaining rounds of 1986 and 1988 were 
characterized, as  Katz (1993) suggests, by a move away from centralization (as several employers 
withdrew from the system), a substantial increase in enterprise-level bargaining, and a much 
greater intensity and depth to local bargaining over non wage issues. Wage policies of firms began 
to emphasize productivity, profit sharing, and contingent pay systems, suggestive of  a shift 
towards a market orientation. 
The bargaining rounds  in the 1990s have been characterized by a period of great 
experimentation in Sweden (Elvander, 1997). While some parties continue to push for further 
decentralization, there have also been efforts to create new collective bargaining norms.  For 
example, the 1989-1990 round represented a return to centralized bargaining for most of Sweden, 
excepting the engineering industry. The 1990 and 1992 bargaining rounds were characterized by 
several different experiments and proposals, such as a wage freeze by the government (to provide 
stability given inflation), which was vociferously opposed by all unions. Finally the parties 
accepted a norm suggested by a group of chief negotiators (the Rehnberg group). But given 
difficulties in implementation in different industries,  the Rehnberg group also functioned as 
mediators; thus, this was a period of mediated centralization with some further pressures for 
decentralization.  
The 1993 round represented continued experimentation with  mediated centralization,  
with members of the Rehnberg group functioning as conciliators for agreements which then set the 
pattern for the industry, but local level decentralization also continued apace.  The bargaining 
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round of 1995 was characterized by even less centralization via the mediation of the Rehnberg 
group and more individualized local agreements, although the Rehnberg group proposed a 
“Europe norm”  (primarily to make the transition into the EEC monetary union smoother) which 
was adopted to some extent in the private sector. Differentiation increased further, however, with 
much sharper divisions between the private and public sectors; the latter experienced far more 
decentralization in terms of  the proportion of increases that were locally determined.   
Thus, there has been a lot of experimentation (or, in terms of the punctuated equilibrium 
theory, an increase in speciation and diversity) in the Swedish system, as the parties try to reach a 
new equilibrium. Each bargaining round has been qualitatively different from the previous one, 
and in each round the degree of decentralization has generally increased.  Most all observers label 
the recent events as a “transformation” of Swedish industrial relations.  
Two other relatively uncontroversial examples of punctuations in industrial relations 
systems have occurred recently in New Zealand and South Africa.  The New Zealand industrial 
relations system has undergone a period of rapid and fundamental change in the 1980s and the 
1990s.   Prior to this, the New Zealand system was stable for a half century (Bray and Hayworth 
1993) and was characterized by compulsory interest arbitration and extension of “blanket” 
coverage throughout the industry through a system of industrial tribunals, and high union density 
(48%)  sustained by  compulsory unionism (union shop provisions).   This form of industrial 
relations was complemented and supported  by an economic strategy which focused on the export 
of primary products such as meat, wool, and fruits, coupled with a high degree of import 
substitution industrialization with protections for local industry.  Since the 1970s, however, there 
has been a steady decline in both agricultural and manufacturing exports (due to international 
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competition), resulting in a steady decline in real wages.  
The response in the mid 1980s was a radical deregulation of the New Zealand economy, 
making it more outward oriented and removing all protective tariffs, price controls, industrial 
licensing and import licensing, coupled with extensive privatization of state owned industries.  As 
part of this deregulation,  there were fundamental reforms in industrial relations legislation.  First, 
the government  tried to make the industrial relations system adapt to the changed economic 
conditions, by encouraging industry-level bargaining councils (from its previously more 
centralized approach), with concomitant changes in union structure. However, in 1991, the 
Employment Contracts Act completely dismantled the previous industrial relations system, 
allowing for individual contracts, removing the compulsory unionism (union shop clause) and 
blanket coverage of the industry. The law also did not impose a duty to bargain on the employer,  
while making allowances for both individual and collective contracts.  In addition, the compulsory 
arbitration system through industrial tribunals (a cornerstone of New Zealand’s IR system for the 
last 50 or so years) was dismantled and replaced with private arbitration and mediation.  As Hince 
and Vranken  (1991) note, all statutory protections given to trade unions have in effect been 
repealed and all dispute settlement procedures have been abolished.  These changes very strongly 
suggest discontinuous transformation. 
The primary feature  of South African industrial relations prior to the lifting of the 
apartheid regime was duality: white workers had collective bargaining rights and well established 
procedures that were not extended to black workers. Over the years, the development of the 
colonial-era slavery system and the deepening of the apartheid system post-independence resulted 
in, as Webster(1997) notes, a culture of informal workplace resistance by black workers that 
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persisted for decades. Although in 1980 the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission to 
extend collective bargaining rights to black workers was designed to channel black conflict away 
from the political sphere to more industrial or business unionism, the legacy of  informal 
workplace resistance built up over decades ensured that the workplace was one of the key centers 
of resistance to the apartheid system during the 1980s.   
After the election of the new  ANC dominated Government of National Unity in 1994, a 
process of  reconstruction and development in South Africa began.  Reforming industrial relations 
was particularly crucial, and in 1996 a new labor relations law took effect. The primary features of 
this law, and thus, the key building blocks of a new system of industrial relations, are the 
following:  the provision of bargaining councils in different industries, the extension of collective 
bargaining rights to all, and a complete overhaul of the dispute settlement machinery with an 
accent on mediation for interest disputes and arbitration for some rights disputes, focused heavily 
on speedy resolution without litigation.  Further, they have established a system of bargained 
corporatism  (Baskin 1993), comprised of four actors: government, labor, employers, and the 
community at large, to create a social and economic contract that focuses on the development of 
South Africa.   
We argue that these three cases are consistent with the description of fundamental change 
provided by the biological analogies discussed above.  In all three cases, there has been 
transformation, i.e. a reconsideration of  “deep structure,” or the network of fundamental and 
interdependent choices (often implicit) that determine the basic configuration of the system.  In 
addition, the change has been rapid relative to the past, and has involved a period of widespread 
experimentation, which is suggestive of  punctuation or “discontinuous transformation.” 
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 In the case of Sweden, the crisis of the 1980s forced several key actors to reexamine the 
basic assumptions and choices previously made about the collective bargaining system. Some of 
the key interdependent choices underlying the previous system were the decisions by employers to 
pursue the maintenance of industrial peace and predictable wage outcomes, by the government to 
pursue macroeconomic stability, and by the unions to pursue wage equalization.  These choices 
influenced the design of the collective bargaining model, through a configuration of centralized 
bargaining via a few bargaining cartels  from the 1950s to the 1980s. In the 1980s, faced with 
increasingly differentiated economic environments, some employers and unions began to 
reconsider the deep structure,  resulting  in a period of rapid and revolutionary change. And, since 
the breakdown in centralized bargaining in the middle of the 1980s, there has been a period of 
increased speciation and experimentation, where there are more differentiated approaches in 
different industries, a significant degree of decentralization, and also, attempts by some of the 
parties to create  a new vision and  consequent norm for  collective bargaining, which has not yet 
been accepted by all parties. Thus,  the Swedish case is consistent with the punctuated equilibrium 
theory; and, as the system does not yet seem to have emerged from its period of disequilibrium, 
we should expect to see more experimentation in the next few bargaining rounds (as in the 1993 
and 1995 rounds) before the Swedish system settles into a new equilibrium.      
In New Zealand as well, there has been a reconsideration of the deep structure. The belief 
that collective bargaining would benefit all workers and employers under an economic 
development regime of agricultural exports and import substitution industrialization  was the  
basis for New Zealand’s post-war industrial relations configuration. These basic beliefs resulted in 
an industrial relations system configuration centered around three key pillars: centralized 
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bargaining, compulsory union membership, and the industrial tribunal system that automatically 
extended collective bargaining agreements to the whole industry (blanket coverage). And, as 
predicted by the punctuated equilibrium perspective,  this system was in equilibrium for a 
significant period of time.  The 1980s was a period of revolution, where there were rapid changes 
in industrial relations, with initial attempts to tinker with the configuration (towards industrial 
bargaining councils) and later action to completely dismantle the system, reflecting the fact that 
the essential ideas on which the system was based (which might be termed “egalitarian”) were 
being reconsidered and replaced with a more decentralized, “free market” orientation.  Clearly, the 
post 1991 industrial relations system in New Zealand represents a sea change from the past, and 
there have been differences across firms in terms  of process, structure and outcomes of industrial 
relations, suggesting both rapid change relative to the past and increased speciation.  
The South African case is also consistent with the punctuated equilibrium framework, with 
one difference. Here the largest actor in industrial relations (black workers) did not have any 
explicit or implicit assumptions or choices about the configuration of the previous system, i.e. they 
were not a willing party to it.  Hence, although the apartheid era industrial relations system in 
South Africa was stable (i.e. in equilibrium for a long period), it was built on a foundation that 
became irrelevant with the change in national political structure: the assumption that black 
workers should be subjugated, which was a choice of  the white government, employers, and some 
white unions.  From 1980 to 1994, with the extension  of collective bargaining rights for black 
workers,  there was experimentation with different approaches, but little reconsideration of the 
previous deep structure. Only after 1994 has there been an attempt to evolve a new system, which 
involves the development of a new deep structure, one that we would characterize as involving the 
 
 
 
 
 
28
                                                          
desire to promote equality and economic and social development.  However, given its recent 
nature, it is particularly difficult to say much  that is definitive at this point about the extent of 
experimentation during the emergent transformatory period.  
Thus,  at least at this level of simplification of these complicated cases, we can identify 
changes in some of the key components of the deep structure, and label the three cases as 
“discontinuous transformations.”  In each of these three cases  the parties have questioned the 
deep structure underlying the basic configuration of the industrial relations system.  And, in all 
three cases, change has been rapid relative to past change in the given system, and there have been 
increases in speciation and diversity of industrial relations structures and practices in Sweden and 
New Zealand in particular. 
While the recent events in Sweden, New Zealand, and South Africa represent fairly 
uncontroversial examples of discontinuous breaks from the past, we would like to consider a more 
controversial case: the development of the "New Deal Labor  Policy" in the United States in the 
1930s and 1940s.9  We attempt here to  give a brief narrative account of the development of the 
New Deal System  that stresses points of consistency with the punctuated equilibrium  theory.  
During the 1930s, arguably, the fundamental social choices (or  "deep structure") underlying the 
United States industrial relations system were  brought under serious consideration: would unions 
be formally sanctioned by law?   What would the basic  mechanisms be for certifying a union and 
for  conducting labor-management  relations?  Even more, how, exactly, would  a union be 
defined, and how would the workplace be governed?   
 
9 Bacharach and Shedd(1996) also provide an account of the development of industrial unionism in the United 
States, concentrating on a longer historical period, to illustrate their arguments regarding the sociology of 
institutional change.  We view our approaches as complementary: we approach a similar question from different 
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Piore and Sabel (1984) argue that "the Depression had called  into  question the viability of 
capitalism" (p. 99), suggesting that the  severe and inexplicable (given existing theoretical 
constructs) economic  crisis is what placed the deep structure of the democratic-capitalist  system 
in question.   Harris (1985) argues that this was  "probably the only set of circumstances when 
American public policy  could have taken such a  dramatic deviation from its past courses.  Only  
the collapse and chronic stagnation of the economy, the desperate search  for answers and 
palliatives, the massive turnover of state and federal  politicians, the partial 'revolution' in the 
balance and social bases of  the two main parties' support, and the accompanying erosion of the  
political influence of the business community, could have created an  opportunity  for something 
like the Wagner Act" (p.183).  These authors,  then, suggest that the depression can be 
conceptualized as a  "revolutionary period" of reconsideration of the deep structure of industrial 
relations (and democratic capitalism more generally), in the  terms of the punctuated equilibrium 
theory.  
The system that resulted  was not extremely pro-labor by European  standards; in fact, it 
was more  rule-driven.  But, it was a radical change from the existing system in the United States, 
and represented  a transition from industrial relations based on raw expression of power,  with 
minimal formal labor rights, to a highly regulated system with both  formal and informal rules 
regulating the union representation process and specifying a relatively high number of  
contingencies in the unionized workplace.10  Once these issues were settled over the course of the  
 
disciplinary perspectives, and illuminate somewhat different aspects of the complex phenomenon of social system 
transformation. 
10 Freeman (1997) argues that the New Deal labor legislation was essentially irrelevant to the increase in union 
membership, which he argues was driven by an “endogenous social process” instead.  Whatever the causality 
(whether the legislation drove social and institutional change or vice-versa), we argue here that the Wagner Act and 
accompanying changes in formal rules and informal practice amounted to a transformation of the form of regulation 
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 nineteen thirties and nineteen forties, given the socio-economic conditions of the time, they were 
no  longer contested;  while there were continuous and minor adjustments,  the system had entered 
a period of  stability during which the "deep  structure" underlying the New Deal Industrial 
Relations System -  reflected in legal and social recognition of the basic legitimacy of  unions - 
was taken for granted.  Thus, we argue that the nineteen thirties and nineteen forties can be 
conceptualized as a "revolutionary period" of rapid and  discontinuous questioning and change in 
the basic assumptions underlying  United States industrial relations, while the later post-war 
period can be  conceptualized as an "equilibrium period" of institutionalization and  entrenchment 
of the policies, reflecting the establishment of the new deep  structure of industrial relations 
whereby unions were accepted as the  legitimate and (and even preferred) means for regulating the 
workplace.    
However, once the socio-economic conditions (such as intense  competition arising out of 
both globalization and changing world  markets) evolved so as to no longer be compatible with the 
operation of  this system and, moreover, the system began to show internal systemic  "wear and 
tear" (e.g. employers learned  how to and/or chose to fully  exploit their advantages under the  
certification election procedures, the excesses  of unions turned public opinion in a non-
collectivist direction, etc.),  the system's viability was once again called into question. It has been 
recently argued that the United States industrial relations system has again  moved into a period of 
transformatory change, where the fundamentals of  labor policy (likely a reflection of the “deep 
structure” of the industrial relations system) are being increasingly debated in both academic and 
policy  circles (see, for example, Strauss (1995) and the Commission on the Future of Worker-
 
of the United States workplace and collective bargaining more generally, with the features of job-control unionism 
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Management Relations (1994)).  Many argue that industrial relations  practice in the United States 
 is also undergoing a period of rapid change and widespread experimentation and “speciation,” 
with the diffusion  of new practices such as team based production, quality circles, worker  
participation, and labor-management collaboration, all practices that  have been construed to 
reflect a fundamental and discontinuous change from the recent history of workplace industrial 
relations in the United States (e.g. Kochan, Katz, and McKersie(1986)).  But, a key question is 
whether the nineteen eighties have seen a reconsideration of the deep structure of industrial 
relations (and the larger socio-economic system) to the same profound degree as was experienced 
in the nineteen thirties. 
We also want to be clear that, in our view, the definition of industrial relations 
“transformation” is not necessarily synonymous with “punctuated equilibrium.”  The German 
system, as discussed above, seems to have recently evolved more gradually and continuously 
away from its previously more centralized incarnation.  The key question in this case would seem 
to be whether the deep structure of the German system has come under serious consideration.  
Does the gradual shift in the emphasis of the works councils reflect a fundamental reconsideration 
of basic societal assumptions?  If so, as many experts argue, then the biological analogies suggest 
that the recent German case should be labeled as an “incremental” or “adaptive” transformation, 
rather than a punctuated equilibrium transformation. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
In recent years researchers have turned their attention to how and why entire industrial 
 
(and, more importantly, the assumptions underlying them) constituting at least as important a break from the past as 
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relations systems evolve, and it has been in the context of the “transformation debate.”  We argue 
that the evolutionary biology and punctuated equilibrium frameworks help to bring some clarity to 
this debate by providing, at a theoretical level,  some guidance for determining whether there has 
been a transformation, as well as the type of transformation,  in a given industrial relations system.  
The essence of any transformation, whether discontinuous or incremental, is the existence 
of serious reconsideration of the network of fundamental, interdependent choices that determine 
the basic configuration into which an industrial relations system’s units are organized (or the 
“deep structure”).  The key defining features of a “discontinuous” or “punctuated equilibrium” (as 
opposed to “incremental” or “adaptive”) transformation in terms of the punctuated equilibrium 
theory are the speed of change (relative to previous periods of “stability” in a given system)  and 
the occurrence of significant experimentation and increases in speciation and diversity.   
However, we also note that distinguishing between “transformation” and “non-
fundamental change” in industrial relations systems is very difficult, particularly in making the 
judgment as to what exactly constitutes “deep structure” and whether it is seriously under 
consideration.   For example, under what circumstances does “significant decentralization” of 
industrial relations process and outcomes indicate a reconsideration of basic assumptions 
regarding the system?   We have mostly identified country-specific indicators of deep structure in 
this paper.  One key question for future research involves the possible existence of more universal 
or generic constituents of deep structure. Some possible universal constituents of “deep structure” 
of industrial relations, in our view, might include attitudes toward and definitions of property 
rights in the workplace, employer/employee relative status, and the nature of exchange in the labor 
 
the representation election procedure. 
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market.  Changes in the essence of employer, union, and government strategies and structures may 
also indicate (if not constitute) changes in deep structure.  We expect, however, that further 
analysis would reveal a wider and more controversial range of constituent elements. 
We have identified two types of transformation: incremental (or adaptive) and 
discontinuous (or punctuated equilibrium).  Given the wide diversity in experience of industrial 
relations systems in the twentieth century, perhaps the most interesting question of all is: Why do 
some systems adapt, while others remain rigid until they encounter discontinuous change?  A 
compelling and intuitive answer to this question is that Tayloristic, job-control based systems are 
inherently rigid and must therefore snap and change in punctuations, while corporatist systems are 
inherently more flexible and therefore can more gradually change to adapt to external 
circumstances that are no longer consistent with the internal logic of the existing system (see 
Locke, Kochan, and Piore (1995, p. 366) for the argument that Tayloristic systems have 
“experienced the greatest pressures to transform their work organization arrangements”).  
The Swedish example, however, suggests that this is not always the case: most everyone, 
including Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (1997), seem to agree both that Sweden is a corporatist 
system and that recent developments there amount to discontinuous change.  Is the Swedish case 
an anomaly, or does this counter-example suggest a different set of causes (beyond the extent of 
Tayloristic job-control) for the type of change experienced by a given system? 11   For now,  we 
 
11 Thelen (1994), invoking Soskice (1990), describes the difference between Germany and Sweden as follows: 
“German employers had greater incentives to seek compromise within the existing framework of bargaining 
because that framework already provided more flexibility through coordinated industry level rather than peak level 
bargaining and because the character of relations between central and local bargaining within Germany’s ‘dual 
system’ facilitated rather than impeded negotiated compromise between unions and employers over issues of 
flexibility…. In Sweden, by contrast, centralized solidaristic wage bargaining had evolved in such a way that it 
inhibited rather than facilitated compromise between unions and employers on the issue of flexibility and 
exacerbated the problems with skilled workers… Centralized bargaining arrangements (in Sweden) thus constrained 
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leave this as an unresolved (but fundamental) research question raised by our analysis: why is it 
that some systems “adapt” while others experience discontinuous change?  
Related to these issues regarding the adaptability of Tayloristic systems is the question of 
whether the various national industrial relations systems are changing in a  similar direction.  Is 
the global economy generating a common set of  external imperatives that are driving the different 
systems toward a single model (most obviously, a model that involves decentralization toward the 
workplace)?  If so, is the extent of transformation in each system a function of the distance from a 
common ideal toward which the systems are evolving?  And, does it even make sense to think in 
terms of “national models,” or are we genuinely experiencing the emergence of a “global 
economy” with a “global industrial relations system”?12  
Thus, we pose as issues for future research the extent and determinants of “incremental” 
versus “discontinuous” change in national industrial relations systems in recent years, as well as 
the extent to which systemic-internal factors, such as demographics and politics, versus external 
environmental factors, such as the alleged “globalization” of the world economy, have driven the 
change, and whether the change in the various systems is in a similar direction.  Obviously, these 
questions in particular will require both time and extensive analysis before firm consensus 
conclusions can be reached. 
We argue that these difficult questions will have to be acknowledged and addressed in 
order to move forward toward a meaningful resolution of the “transformation debate.” What we 
have attempted to do here is more modest: to provide the beginnings of a framework for defining 
 
unions’ ability to negotiate more flexible wages and generated strong incentives for employers to dismantle the 
institutions that produced and reproduced these effects” (pp. 121-122). 
12 To complicate matters further, some argue that it makes more sense to think in terms of regional economic and 
industrial relations systems, rather than national or global systems.  See Locke(1995). 
 
 
 
 
 
35
industrial relations system transformation and for distinguishing incremental from discontinuous 
transformation in those systems. 
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Table 1:  Studies of Industrial Relations System Transformations 
 
 
Study Claim Basis for 
Transformation Thesis 
 
Kochan, Katz, and 
McKersie (1986) 
 
Transformation 
 
Level of bargaining; 
Strategic decision 
makers; 
Innovations in 
workplace practices 
 
Katz (1993) 
 
Transformation 
 
Employer initiated 
decentralization of 
bargaining 
 
Locke, Kochan and 
Piore (1995) 
 
Transformation 
 
Enterprise focus; 
Increased flexibility; 
Focus on skills 
development; 
Union membership 
declines 
 
Armingeon (1994) 
 
Transformation 
 
Changes in legislation 
 
Kuruvilla (1996) 
 
Transformation 
 
Changes in IR policy 
and practice 
 
Golden, Wallerstein and 
Lange (1997) 
 
No Transformation 
 
Union density and 
coverage rates; 
Union concentration 
and monopoly;  
Statutory authority of 
central unions and 
employer federations; 
Centralization of wage 
bargaining 
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Crouch (1993) No Transformation Stability of formal 
institutional 
mechanisms 
 
Hyman (1994) 
 
No Transformation 
 
Dimensions of change 
in management 
initiative; 
Decline of unionism; 
Deregulation of labor 
markets; 
Decline of national 
systems 
 
Dunlop (1993) 
 
No Transformation 
 
Adaptations in IR due 
to changing 
demographic, market, 
technological and 
political environment 
 
Freeman and Katz 
(1995) 
  
Mixed evidence 
regarding increased 
variation in wage 
structures  
 
